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Executive Summary
The use of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) such as GPS and Galileo are vital sources
of positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) information for vehicles. This information is of
critical importance for connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) due to their dependence on this
information for localisation, route planning and situational awareness. A downside to solely
relying on GNSS for PNT is that the signal strength arriving from navigation satellites in space
is weak and currently there is no authentication included in the civilian GNSS adopted in the
automotive industry. This means that cyber-attacks against the GNSS signal via jamming or
spoofing are attractive to adversaries due to the potentially high impact they can achieve.
This report introduces specifications and recommendations for GNSS cyber-security test
facilities for CAVs. These specifications are based on a survey of academic literature, interviews
with a select group of experts, and experiences obtained performing laboratory and real-world
testing (shown in Figure 1).
c© 2020 WMG c© 2020 WMG
Figure 1: PNT cyber resilience feasibility study carried out at Wellesbourne Campus
Key Findings
The three key findings of this report are:
1. Spoofing and jamming attacks on GNSS signals are capable of leading to severe loss of
functionality and safety in CAVs by denying them access to or providing them with incorrect
positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information.
2. PNT testing facilities are urgently needed across a wide spectrum of capabilities, from
simulation in artificial environments to over-the-air (OTA) testing in labs and real-world
environments. Procedures to legally perform real-world testing via OTA broadcasts need
to be developed.
3. There is existing work on the standardisation of GNSS attack detection and GNSS resiliency
assessment. Zenzic, UK CAV testbeds, the University of Warwick and Spirent should work
with these bodies to guide the development of standards, and to further develop both
attack event detection and responsible disclosure of information on threat actors and attack
events.
ii
Attack Detection and Mitigation
As described in detail in [2], from the academic literature surveyed, as well as the practical
Lab2Live work carried out in the course of the project, it is evident that robust countermeasures
for GNSS vulnerabilities are required for CAVs, CAM and ITS. Because it is envisaged that
the threat landscape will evolve, nation states must invest in addressing cyber-security as it
relates to public infrastructure that relies, in full or in part, on GNSS for operation. With
respect to GNSS threats, a wide range of attacks can be carried out both at the physical and
software layer. For the latter, software attacks involve sending crafted packets in order to exploit
software vulnerabilities in the GNSS receiver’s implementation of calculating the position and
time from the NAV data sent by GNSSs, which can lead to violations of availability or integrity.
For the former, jamming attacks are prevalent in today’s transport networks, however, not all
occurrences are intentional. Hence, threat actors can employ similar commercially available
devices to disrupt a CAV or CAM. Spoofing attacks are also likely to occur, but require advanced
knowledge and detailed information about the target, and are thus not yet an immediate threat.
Nevertheless, the ability of threat actors will evolve with the proliferation of software defined
radio and networking capabilities, hence spoofing attacks do need to be addressed by a future
CAV cyber-security test facility. An overview of GNSS attack vulnerabilities is shown in Figure 2.
c© 2020 Spirent Communications Plc
Figure 2: Range of typical GNSS vulnerabilities
Academia and industry are already developing detection and mitigation techniques to enhance
the robustness of GNSS receivers. As made evident in [2] and the reviewed literature therein,
jamming and spoofing are usually detected and/or mitigated using different techniques, which
have different implementation architectures and varying complexity. The approach employed
by the CAV or CAM designer can involve mitigation techniques with which the attack is not
only detected, but also its effect is minimised. In order to reduce the complexity and enhance
the resilience testing, joint mitigation as well as joint detection techniques need to be adopted
by OEMs. Testing methodologies for software systems are being developed as well, however, as
exhaustive testing of all inputs is impossible due to the large input state-space, important inputs
can be identified with a sensitivity analysis and the crafted values to focus testing on can be
chosen based on this analysis.
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Community Experience
Whereas the academic literature generally focuses on research and innovations, this project
also invited a wide range of experts from the automotive, PNT and cyber-security industries
to provide their opinions on CAV GNSS resilience and vulnerabilities. This approach allowed
the project team to obtain a different perspective from key industry players on how to address
vulnerabilities associated with PNT for CAVs and CAM. From the interviews, it was evident
that CAV PNT attacks such as jamming and spoofing are credible, the PNT threat landscape
needs to be studied as it evolves and the CAV needs to studied as a system-of-systems.
Testing
A Lab2Live approach to CAV PNT cyber resilience testing has been adopted in this project,
yielding complementary results from the lab-based and real-world, live-sky work. A plethora
of procedures to execute PNT attack scenarios exists, hence both lab-based and live testing
require labour-intense work before all interesting parameters are investigated, and a complete
and reliable conclusion on a system’s PNT-attack resilience can be provided. In order to carry
out the full range of Lab2Live tests, a PNT attack emulator as used in this presented feasibility
study is an ideal component of a robust research methodology.
From the lessons learnt and findings of this project, it can be seen that threat actors,
attack vectors and countermeasures will evolve. As a result, government and all associated
stakeholders need to continue to work together to foster collaborative research and
development that is capable of testing and certifying PNT for CAVs and CAM in
the UK.
Specifications and Recommendations
The knowledge obtained from the expert interviews and the Lab2Live feasibility study were used
to develop these specifications and recommendations which are further described in Chapter 4.
Specifications
S
1
A set of standard threat actors who attack GNSS systems should be defined, e.g., by the
National Cyber Security Centre, and made available to the testing facility. Tests should
then focus on these threat actors. This list should be revised over time as the threat
landscape evolves.
S
2
A test facility should support performing tests over the full range of the test continuum,
from simulation to emulation to testing in a real world environment.
There need to be sufficient capabilities across the UK to support the testing of jamming
or spoofing GNSS signals: (i) using GNSS testing equipment via a physical connection to
the CAV’s GNSS receiver or (ii) an over-the-air attack with a portable GNSS simulator
enclosed within an anechoic chamber.
If possible, specific test sites should also aim to (iii) support live, outdoor, jamming or
spoofing of GNSS signals. This is required to test the feasibility of such attacks in a
real-world environment and to further improve the simulations of such attacks.
iv
S
3 The equipment used to perform PNT attack emulation should support technical capabil-
ities that are necessary to perform testing.
S
4 A test facility should provide access to an anechoic chamber to allow legal testing of OTA
attacks on GNSS systems.
S
5
A test facility should provide areas in which non-OTA testing can be safely performed in
real-world environments. A variety of environments (e.g., urban, rural, motorway) need
to be supported to test the environmental impact on an attacker’s capabilities and the
impact on the implemented mitigations.
S
6 A standard set of metrics should be defined and used to evaluate the resilience of CAM
systems when their PNT system is under cyber-attack.
S
7 A test facility needs to be able to support evaluating the resilience of a vehicle against
single and multi-sensor attacks.
S
8 A standard test suite of GNSS jamming and spoofing attacks should be defined and made
available to organisations performing testing at different test facilities.
S
9
The test facility should supply a group of control vehicles with known functionality and
responses to a test suite. This is in order to:
• Ensure the test has the same impact on the control vehicle.
• Evaluate the possible different impacts on the test and control vehicle.
S
10
A set of appropriate sites need to be identified where PNT attacks can be performed in
real-world environments in order to understand and demonstrate the feasibility of an
adversary performing these attacks.
S
11 A test facility needs to have contacts with relevant authorities in order to guide the
testing performed in terms of the national interest.
S
12 A test facility needs to be able to hold classified information and have the ability to
report information such as critical vulnerabilities to the relevant authorities.
S
13 A testbed should provide facilities that support testing of the PNT attack resilience of
individual components and multiple interacting systems.
S
14 Employees at a test facility need to have skills in RF, cyber-security and automotive.
S
15 Employees at a test facility need to be suitably vetted, and risks posed by employees and
contractors (i.e. insider threat) need to be appropriately managed.
v
Recommendations
R
1 Vehicles should be tested in various driving modes (if possible): (i) GNSS-only and (ii)
fusion of GNSS with other vehicle on-board sensors.
R
2 A set of standards needs to be created to measure the resilience of PNT attacks against
CAM systems.
R
3 A test facility should subscribe to GNSS threat monitoring and reporting services and usethe provided information to revise standards and testing strategies based on real-world
incidents.
R
4 Zenzic should maintain a directory of facilities available and their supported aspects of
cyber-security testing.
R
5 A test facility should consider to facilitate testing classes of CAM beyond automobiles,
such as UAVs, USVs and UUVs.
Future UK Position
The UK needs a sovereign capability in CAV cyber-security regardless of other country’s positions
and should strive to be a leader in PNT system-of-systems resilience. Addressing the resilience of
ITS system-of-systems is a hard challenge, but is also of high value in terms of national defence
and UK export opportunities. Systems and facilities need to be resilient in the face of PNT
attacks not just at the component level, but rather at the system-of-systems level. Whereas
hardening against attacks risks a new attack finding a novel exploit path, resilience attempts to
reduce the potential catastrophic impact of novel and unconsidered attacks. The adversaries that
pose the highest threat, will combine and cascade attacks across systems to create an emergent
effect at the system-of-systems level. Hence the UK needs to show leadership and focus on
thorough secure and behind closed-doors testing, amongst other testing approaches, through
supporting the PNT industry-leaders and independent expert research organisations.
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1 Introduction
This report details experiences obtained performing cyber-security testing of the Positioning,
Navigation and Timing (PNT) system on an example autonomous vehicle under test (VUT).
Using this experience, plus lessons learnt from previous large-scale tests, and insight gained from
interviews with experts, we present recommendations for cyber- and vehicle-testing facilities to
support performing PNT cyber-security testing.
The remainder of this chapter will summarise attacks against GNSSs and also describe related
projects that have previously made recommendations. A summary of the interviews performed
with experts to understand the importance of testing and developing mitigations for these threats
is presented in Chapter 2 and a summary of the practical testing performed in this project is
described in Chapter 3. The specifications for a CAV-focused GNSS cyber-security testbed are
presented in Chapter 4, including a number of advised recommendations. Finally, Chapter 5
summarises our findings, specifications and recommendations based on our survey of threats,
interviews and testing, with the aim to improve the resilience of connected and automated
mobility (CAM) solutions that require GNSS by cyber-security testing.
1.1 Methodology
In order to create specifications and recommendations for a GNSS cyber-security test facility for
CAVs, with a specific focus on CAV PNT systems, we have followed below project methodology:
1. Survey literature in [2] to identify (i) threats, (ii) methods to detect threats, and (iii)
techniques to mitigate these threats.
2. Ask relevant experts to provide input on which identified threats are high-priority and how
a testbed should be designed to evaluate CAM system’s resilience to these threats.
3. Perform a feasibility study by attacking GNSS receivers throughout the full test continuum,
starting in the lab and finishing with live scenario tests, in order to understand how
these testing environments complement each other, and to develop an optimised black box
research methodology for the vast range of PNT attack scenarios.
4. Summarise this information and obtained experience to present recommendations for a
new cyber test facility in this report.
This methodology led to the conclusion that PNT testing facilities are urgently needed across
a wide spectrum of capabilities, from simulation in artificial environments to over-the-air testing
in labs and real-world environments, and resulted in a set of specifications and recommendations
for such facility.
1.2 GNSS Attacks Summary
This report focuses on three kinds of attacks on GNSS signals: jamming, spoofing and software.
Attacking these signals does not require significant knowledge or expenditure in terms of resources,
but can lead to significant impacts. This makes performing these attacks favourable to a threat
actor, instead of performing more complicated attacks with greater resource and knowledge
requirements.
1
Jamming is when an adversary denies access to position and timing information contained
within a GNSS signal. It is the simplest PNT attack, as it requires an attacker broadcasting
sufficient noise to prevent decoding of the GNSS signal, which is of low signal strength itself [10]
compared to other common RF signals, such as Wi-Fi. Devices that perform jamming can
be easily obtained for little money and operated without technical knowledge [11]. Users are
typically aware that a jamming attack is occurring [12], but low-power jamming can be difficult
to detect [13].
Spoofing is when an adversary supplies alternate GNSS signals containing position and timing
information that may be different to that in the actual GNSS signals. Spoofing is harder to
perform than jamming as the attack typically is performed stealthily with an aim to go undetected
and slowly shift the position and time of the receiver. Performing a spoofing attack can be
complicated, especially with mobile targets, due to the difficultly in making the produced signal
appear authentic. Equipment to perform this attack is more expensive than equipment used to
perform jamming, however, simple implementation can be obtained relatively cheaply [14].
Software attacks are an additional spoofing case to consider when maliciously crafted data is
sent within the spoofed GNSS navigation message. As a GNSS receiver will need to decode and
process the data within this message to calculate position, velocity and time, if there is a bug
within this processing it could be exploited by crafted data in the message. One example in [15]
spoofed the navigation message such that a satellite was located at the centre of the Earth. This
led to a denial of service attack against the GNSS receiver, because it caused a division by zero
error that was repeated each time the receiver restarted as it had cached the malicious value.
1.3 Related Recommendations
There has been a great deal of interest in securing GNSS for a variety of systems in the past. This
includes interest from GNSS maintainers, academia, industry, and government. In this section,
projects and groups that have previously made recommendations about the cyber-security of
GNSSs will be summarised. Recommendations made in those projects will be used to inform the
recommendations that are made in this report.
1.3.1 STRIKE3
The STRIKE3 project, which ran from February 2016 to January 2019, aimed to produce
a non-sector-specific, standardisation of GNSS threat reporting and receiver testing [16, 17].
Multiple sensors were installed to detect potential GNSS attack events. The STRIKE3 project
focused its efforts on GNSS jamming due to the ease and likelihood of such an attack being
performed. The researchers in STRIKE3 discounted spoofing and meaconing [7, § 2.4.1] due
to the anticipated difficulty, equipment requirement and desire to focus testing the impact of
interference observed in real-world monitoring. However, events such as [18, 19] mean there are
intentional and unintentional spoofing attacks that need to be considered when testing GNSS
receivers.
As part of its data gathering on jamming events, the STRIKE3 project built a database
of GNSS jamming attacks [20] which was grouped into 11 broad attack classifications. This
information was used to draft standards for threat monitoring and reporting [12, 21] and testing of
GNSS receivers [7]. We recognise that those standards for GNSS jamming are comprehensive and
will form the basis of our recommendations for testing GNSS jamming. As these recommendations
target the behaviour and functioning of CAVs, there will be some differences due to the higher
system level focus. We are also of the opinion, that it is important to consider spoofing and
other classes of attacks that are not considered in STRIKE3, therefore, we will make additional
recommendations for those other kinds of threats.
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1.3.2 Government Office for Science Report
In 2018 the UK’s Government Office for Science produced a report [6] on GNSSs, threats and
the potential impact attacks could have across the UK’s critical national infrastructure (CNI).
As part of this report, Chapter 5 discusses standards and testing of systems using GNSS to
supply PNT information. Whereas a number of standardisation initiatives were highlighted,
the report concludes that there is still a need for a unified standardisation approach. This
includes specifying a single set of metrics to assess systems against. In terms of testing, the
report highlights three main issues: (i) there are no common testing standards, (ii) testing a
system-of-systems is difficult, and (iii) there is a lack of information about what UK-facilities are
available to perform tests at. These are also issues that need to be addressed for the testing of
PNT attacks against CAM systems.
1.3.3 Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation
The Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation have published a number of US-focused
recommendations for GNSS resilience [22]. These recommendations fall under three categories:
protect, toughen and augment.
Protect describes recommendations to locate jamming (similar to STRIKE3), improve legis-
lation, and prevent transmissions in adjacent frequency bands from exceeding the power
limits.
Toughen describes using GNSS receivers with jamming and spoofing-resistant technology, using
more than one PNT source for CNI, and having CNIs continuing normal operations when
GNSS service is disrupted.
Augment describes using alternate PNT sources other than GNSS to augment localisation and
time synchronisation of a system.
These recommendations are useful high-level guidelines for industry and government to follow.
Testing facilities should aim to evaluate the level of resilience that systems which followed these
guidelines have obtained.
1.4 Summary
Whereas previous work exists, that made recommendations about testing the resilience of GNSS
to provide PNT in general, there has been a lack of work that focuses on its vehicular context.
This report will make recommendations that are focused on the specific requirements of vehicular-
focused testing. Some of these recommendations overlap with general PNT testing, however,
others arise due to the design of connected and autonomous mobility systems.
3
2 Community Experience
In order to understand which of our identified threats are currently being performed, are believed
to have a high impact and where future effort needs to be focused, we interviewed a range of
experts with experience and knowledge of GNSS attacks and automotive cyber-security. This
chapter will present a summary of the results from these interviews, highlight important issues
and future areas for investigation that were raised by the experts being interviewed. Interviews
were separately performed by Spirent and WMG. The interviews performed by WMG were
granted ethical approval to be performed by the University of Warwick’s Biomedical & Scientific
Research Ethics Committee [BSREC 61/19-20].
2.1 Findings
GNSS Importance and Threats
“ GNSS provides extremely low cost, accurate time, and position and velocity data. ”“ The time aspect is always important, location depends on where the vehicle endsup being — a fall back must exist — e.g., in an area where positioning signals aredifficult to receive, they cannot just hand back control directly to the driver. ”“ The threat is very real — we have gathered over 100 records of incidents/attacks,which were a mix of deliberate and accidental incidents, covering all areas fromaccidental leakage, to malfunctioning devices and fraud. ”The importance of GNSS to supply PNT information was highlighted by the interviewees.This includes both the position and timing information included in the GNSS signal. Some
participants had experienced attacks being performed, whereas others were aware of databases
(e.g., STRIKE3) that recorded real events.
Adversaries
“ The objective of the attacker needs to be determined before evaluating the severity.The mindset of the adversary is essential to determine the severity of effects. Allcould be low or high impact. Objectives can vary widely. ”Our interviews failed to conclusively identify if jamming or spoofing were higher priority threatsto focus on. Jamming can be easily performed, easily detected and can be difficult to mitigate,
whereas spoofing is often harder to detect, harder to perform, but can cause greater impacts. One
conclusion was that it is important to evaluate adversaries and their capabilities in combination
with the context in which vehicles will be attacked in order to be able to identify threats and
evaluate their impact.
“ Many receivers we tested had anti-spoof technology, but could still be spoofed. ”“ There will be a growth in use of SDR technology to attack CAVs due to its highavailability and low-cost SDRs are already being used for a variety of RF cyber-attackse.g., in car thefts based on keyless systems. ”The technology used to perform these attacks is becoming more sophisticated, more availableand at a lower cost. Technologies such as SDRs may increase the likelihood of being impacted by
jamming and spoofing threats due to lower barriers to entry for adversaries.
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Mitigations
“ Safety and security need to be investigated hand-in-hand. ”“ CAV is part of an ITS. So security of the rest of the ITS needs to be studied. ACAV can also be an attack vector to an ITS and this also needs to be studied. Thesecurity of a CAV cannot be addressed in isolation. ”There is a need for security to not be considered in isolation. It is vital that safety and operational
aspects of a vehicle are also considered when providing security. This is difficult due to the
complexity of the system in which a CAV operates. Testing facilities need to provide suitable
space to ensure security mechanisms do not impact safety and include ways to test how quickly a
CAV can recover from attack. As these attacks may be persistent, some permanent facilities are
required to perform long-term testing. Testing facilities will also need to provide infrastructure
on which attacks can be emulated, so the impact on a CAV can be examined.
Fusion With Other PNT Sources
“ I would like to see other signals/alternative technologies to aid and support navigationwhich would improve resilience over time. ”“ Improve robustness and resilience by having an alternative positioning system.Vehicles already have IMU and other sensors to cover the position when GNSSsignal is lost, and then they use mapping software which results in a good qualitylevel of the position. But for fully autonomous vehicles, accuracy is more important,
so a higher level of robustness to spoofing is required. ”One key point regarding the resilience of a PNT system is the need to fuse information with
alternate sensors. As a vehicle will not only have access to GNSS to provide PNT information,
the other sensors such as IMUs, LIDAR, and local clocks need to be used to provide redundancy
when GNSS is under attack and vice versa. However, this raises further considerations as the
weight of trust between sensors needs to evaluated. Future testbeds need to be able to support
verifying the ability of these sensors to provide redundancy and also be able to test concurrent
attacks against multiple sensors.
Facilities
“ A test facility is key, both a real-world and synthetic capability (such as a digitaltwin) to create conditions that represent an attack that might be used on a system. ”“ Access to a national database of testing facilities would be useful due to the difficultiesof performing practical testing without a Faraday cage. ”The need for either more testing facilities, or an increase in their discoverability was highlighted
by the participants. There is a need for facilities with a wide range of testing capabilities for
CAM systems (such as for shipping and drones) and not solely for CAV systems. These facilities
need to support a spectrum of testing from simulation to real-world OTA testing. The other
aspect that was highlighted was the need to include environmental considerations both when
performing testing with simulators, and when performing OTA testing in anechoic chambers.
This is necessary to improve the real-world relevance of this testing.
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Testing
“ Consider architectures of different vehicle manufactures of different PNT implement-ations and architectures. Different architectures would be hacked different ways.Testing needs to be manufacturer agnostic and should be able to apply to differentmanufacturer architecture. ”When performing testing it is important to not solely focus on the impact of the vehicle, but
also consider indirect impacts from attacks on infrastructure and other interacting systems. This
testing needs to be designed in a generic way to facilitate testing arbitrary combinations of
equipment from different OEMs. Test facilities will also need to be able to undertake testing
from a wide system-of-systems perspective, which will include testing additional equipment that
is connected to or interacts with a vehicle.
Personnel
“ It is not only about investing in the technology and the infrastructure, but also aboutthe people and the process. Therefore, you need to have the technology in place andthen you need to train the people how to use the technology and understand thedifferences in the technologies applied. You also want to train people in matters of
raising awareness on what they are doing and what problems could appear, so they
can report any abnormality that they identify. ”While technology can be key in detecting and mitigating attacks on GNSS systems, it is important
to consider the human element of securing a complex system. While mandating a human-in-
the-loop for all autonomous activities may be undesirable, it may be suitable for highly trained
staff to monitor events at a higher level. Such staff would need to apply suitable training and
intuition to identify attacks that autonomous systems may not be looking for.
2.2 Summary
The opinions provided by the experts interviewed highlighted that jamming, spoofing and timing
attacks are all practical for an attacker to perform and can lead to impacts on a vehicle. We have
made some general conclusions in areas where general (if not unanimous) agreement was observed
by participants in the survey. However, the conclusions expressed below do not necessarily
reflect the views of all of the individual participants or of the organisations they represent. The
conclusions drawn from these interviews have been used to inform the specifications required for
GNSS cyber-security CAV test facilities and also the recommendations that have been made in
Chapter 4.
• The threats to CAV PNT cyber-security should be dealt with as a high priority matter.
• There is a need to develop a common and consistent methodology for assessing PNT
cyber-security risks.
• There is a need to consider the impact of sensor fusion on testing attacks and developing
mitigations.
• The responsible disclosure of incidents and discovered vulnerabilities is essential in the
commercial sector, especially for safety and liability-critical applications such as CAV.
• There is a risk that manufacturers expect a certain level of performance from the devices
they procure, hence do not test them for resilience and robustness themselves.
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2.3 Future
From these interviews, other than the valuable input into the state of the threat landscape and
testbed specifications, there are three sets of collaborations that the CAV-focused field would
benefit from having future engagements with.
1. The newly announced National Timing Centre in the UK has the aim to improve “security
and resilience, communication and implementation of new technologies, and pave the way
for trusted time and frequency across the country” [23]. The UK CAV industry may find
it advantageous to work with the National Timing Centre to develop new methods for
delivering and securing the precise timing data needed by CAVs.
2. There is room for greater co-ordination/co-operation between agencies and industry. The
STRIKE3 project [12] has shown that the collection, storage and characterisation of
real world interference threats is possible, but the sharing and reporting mechanisms are
currently fragmented and un-coordinated.
3. The range of opinions given by all survey participants suggests that a future public round
table involving CAV cyber-security stakeholders from industry, government, academia,
regulators and institutes could prove to be very beneficial to all parties involved in CAV
PNT system cyber-security.
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3 Testing Experience
This project has shown that the chosen Lab2Live methodological approach, starting with lab-
based testing on isolated GNSS-receivers and finishing with real-world tests on a black box
CAV, provides the complimentary and comprehensive results that are required to evaluate a
system’s PNT cyber resilience [2]. In the laboratory, controlled tests were carried out on three
GNSS receivers using Spirent’s PNT attack emulator (PNTAE) for spoofing attacks and a vector
signal generator (VSG) for replicating intentional electromagnetic interference. In the lab-based
tests, observable parameters such as the signal power, number of visible satellite vehicles (SVs),
and the time-to-first-fix (TTFF) of the respective receivers were evaluated with respect to
emulated jamming and spoofing attacks. This fed into the development of model-independent,
black box research methodologies for real-world, live-sky tests, as would be used in a cyber-
physical testing facility when certain detailed component-level information might neither be
disclosed nor otherwise available. In Figure 3.1, the attack emulators for the respective tests
are shown, and Figure 3.2 displays the VUT and its trajectory at the Wellesbourne Campus of
the University of Warwick. Generalising the live results, leads to the conclusion that real-world
testing on a CAV-system can result in distinctively different observations than those made in a
lab environment. This can be understood through the influence of the GNSS implementation in
the CAV’s operating system and potential sensor fusion algorithms, e.g. including the inertial
navigation system (INS); cameras and radar, on the associated decision-making processes. As
these results complement each other, in order to determine a CAV’s or CAM PNT cyber resilience,
tests should thus be carried out that span the full continuum, from simulation to emulation,
to tests on intelligent vehicles inside a dedicated lab, to real-world environment testing on
autonomously-driving vehicles.
c© 2020 WMG
(a) Mobile jamming set-up
c© 2020 WMG
(b) Mobile spoofing set-up
Figure 3.1: Researchers preparing equipment for live, real-world tests at Wellesbourne Campus
3.1 Legality of Performing Tests
In the UK there are two main pieces of legislation that need to be considered when performing
the type of tests (jamming and spoofing of GNSS signals) envisaged in this feasibility study.
The first and most important is Section 68 of The Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, which deems
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c© 2020 WMG
(a) VUT at Wellesbourne
Map data c© 2020 Google
(b) VUT test trajectory
Figure 3.2: VUT testing performed at Wellesbourne
jamming and spoofing of signals illegal in the UK. For this study, therefore, we have either
performed indoor OTA tests inside an anechoic chamber, or outdoor non-OTA tests during which
the jamming or spoofing signal was added to the authentic signal through coaxial cables and a
high-power RF combiner, with negligible spurious emissions. The second piece of legislation is
The Electromagnetic Compatibility Regulations 2016, SI 2016/1091 which restricts the import
and sale of jammers and requires that apparatuses must not cause excessive interference. The
attack emulators used in this feasibility study are test signal generators and their transmissions
are strictly contained either over coaxial cable or within an environment that do not allow for
RF leakage, such as an anechoic chamber or a Faraday cage.
Currently, the regulator for the UK communications services (Ofcom) only allows GNSS
jamming testing by the Ministry of Defence, and considers it a crime if carried out by anyone
else [24, § 68]. To use any radio transmitting device in the UK, it will need to either be licensed,
or have a specific licence exemption. Ofcom’s most related licence products are the GNSS
repeater licence and the Innovation and trial license1. The latter is a non-operational licence
for testing, research or demonstration, and is also recommended for work carried out inside a
Faraday-shielded chamber. The detailed information regarding these pieces of legislation should
be fed into LR43 [26, p. 99] on the Zenzic Roadmap, and used to simplify the process of obtaining
relevant licences to perform testing, or to document under which circumstances these licences
are not required.
An alternate approach to mitigating these legal issues is to up or downconvert GNSS frequen-
cies before transmission and after reception. In [8], GNSS frequencies were downconverted from
1575.42 MHz to 915 MHz in the US ISM band, and vice versa. The ISM bands are for industrial,
scientific and medical applications, and other applications using them (e.g. telecommunication)
must tolerate any interference generated from ISM applications. A downside to this technique
is that the down-conversion could change aspects of the signal which may lead to attacks and
defences not precisely matching those that an attacker would use to attack the system and/or
the techniques the system could use to defend against those attacks. More research is needed to
determine the efficacy of such testing approach.
1https://www.ofcom.org.uk/manage-your-licence/radiocommunication-licences/non-operational-
licences
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3.2 Difficulties Associated with VUT Testing
Locating and Interfacing with GNSS receiver
Depending on how much technical detail a mobility OEM can share about the PNT receiver
system and its peripheral sensors (e.g., antennas locations), access to the individual components
allows systematic testing at all relevant scales and complexities of the test continuum. This also
includes taking into account the potential differential GNSS implementation in the receiver.
Interfacing with ECUs
Depending on the level of embedding of the GNSS receiver, and possible fusion processes with
other automotive sensors, access to the relevant electronic control units (ECUs) is crucial for an
in-depth understanding of the attack’s impact.
Sensor Fusion
In a black box CAV testing scenario, it is difficult to pinpoint the influence of potential sensor
fusion algorithms, e.g., including the INS; cameras and radar, on the associated decision-making
processes.
Lab versus Real-World
As highlighted in [2], results from lab-based and real-world PNT testing can differ substantially.
A set of comparable metrics and a robust research methodology should guarantee that the
results are complementary to each other. Furthermore, adapting a CAV to real-world, spurious
emission-free OTA attacks using a custom enclosure for its GNSS receiver and the attack antenna,
requires innovatory engineering steps to guarantee reliability during mobile testing.
Health and Safety
Real world attacks on CAVs can trigger unexpected behaviour. Adequate precautions thus have
to be taken, e.g. to facilitate movement outside the expected trajectory, but also to stop the
VUT when a PNT attack is in progress.
Power Supply
During real-world, mobile, field tests, testing equipment requires a safe and reliable power source.
As commercial power inverters in-between a potential electric-powered CAV’s battery and the
equipment might not support the required power levels, uninterruptible power supplies could be
best suitable.
3.3 Impact Analysis of PNT Attack
Black box, grey box and component-level testing each allow for different depths in their analysis
of the impact of a PNT attack. Whereas for the latter all essential PNT parameters of interest
can be observed and possibly recorded, for the former two, if no GNSS telemetry output is
available (e.g., in NMEA format) sometimes the impact of the attack can only be derived from
the CAV’s behaviour. In particular, it is difficult to:
• know whether the autonomous vehicle uses PNT information provided by GNSS.
• know which GNSS constellations are implemented in the GNSS receiver.
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• know when sensor fusion is implemented, how that sensor information interacts with GNSS
inconsistencies?
• test the impact of timing attacks.
Under these circumstances, it is best to start with the most basic jamming and spoofing
attacks, followed by slowly increasing realism, depending on the kinds of attacks that can be
simulated with the GNSS testing equipment, as described in [2].
• Start with most basic and only include the spoofed signal
• Increase realism by including both the real signal and the spoofed signal
3.4 Conclusion
Lab-based device and CAV PNT cyber testing allows for a controlled and partially programmable
research methodology, with straightforward to reproduce results. Live testing, on the other
hand, involves a number of uncontrollable and unknown parameters which increase the amount
of required testing before a well-founded conclusion can be made about a VUT’s PNT attack
resilience. Real-world CAV and PNT testing is bounded by legal restrictions, amongst others
on spurious RF emissions. Real OTA PNT attacks to a VUT, mimicking most realistically an
adversary’s capabilities, are thus difficult to achieve without a dedicated, limited-access, large
area, testing facility.
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4 Specifications and Recommendations
Based on a survey of related academic literature, our experiences performing practical testing,
and the knowledge gained by interviewing experts in the community, in this chapter we present
recommendations on the specifications for a CAV cyber-security test facility and other relevant
recommendations.
4.1 Testing Preliminaries
Before performing testing it is necessary to understand the context within which systems will be
used and put under threat of attack. This context should then be used to guide how cyber-security
testing of the system is performed.
1. Identify who the threat actors are, what goals, motivations, resources, knowledge and
presence they will have. Use this information to inform the kinds of testing that will be
performed.
• Goals: What is the threat actor trying to achieve?
• Motivations: Why does an adversary want to perform a GNSS attack?
• Resources: What equipment/tools/finance/personnel/etc does the threat actor have?
• Knowledge: What information does the adversary have? How does this impact the
way in which they perform GNSS attacks?
• Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs): Is the attack likely to be slow and silent,
requiring persistence on the system, or quick and noisy? How will attacks likely be
conducted?
2. Build representative test cases for the identified threats that may be executed.
3. Perform safety and risk assessment for test cases.
Although difficult, it is useful to identify the risk posed by threats and use the calculated
risk level to prioritise implementing mitigations for threats. Risk is typically calculated as the
impact of a threat (e.g., financial cost) multiplied by the likelihood of the threat (a probability).
An example of this risk calculation was performed by the Resilient Navigation and Timing
Foundation in [27], where the highest impact was calculated for jamming attacks performed by
criminal, terrorist, and military-level threat actors.
As per TD09 in the Zenzic Roadmap [26, p. 97], a national threat database needs to be
created. Information on threat actors should be included in this database in order to contextualise
the threats in that database.
Specification 1: A set of standard threat actors who attack GNSS systems should be
defined, e.g., by the National Cyber Security Centre, and made available to the testing
facility. Tests should then focus on these threat actors. This list should be revised over
time as the threat landscape evolves.
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4.2 Testing Methodology
When designing tests for arbitrary CAM solutions there may be limited access to internal aspects
of the system. In this case the system needs to be treated as a black box. However, if greater
access to the internal systems is available then grey box testing can be performed. Grey box
testing allows for a more targeted approach due to knowledge of the system. It is also important
to understand how much access to the vehicle’s telemetry is available. Additional metrics can be
evaluated for a test case when the testers have access to detailed telemetry from the vehicle.
1. Treat the autonomous vehicle as a black box, without access to telemetry:
• Identify scenarios in which to perform testing.
• Perform control experiments (VUT not under attack) to obtain baseline performance.
• Observe VUT behaviour and evaluate if deviations occur when comparing control
experiment to simulated GNSS attack.
• Evaluate if deviations are expected or not.
• Use a secondary GNSS receiver which receives the same input as the vehicle’s receiver
to verify that the GNSS testing equipment has the intended impact.
2. Treat the autonomous vehicle as a black-box, with access to telemetry:
• Perform the same testing as for Level 1.
• Use VUT telemetry information to verify that GNSS testing equipment has the
intended impact.
3. Perform grey box testing on the autonomous vehicle:
• Perform the same testing as for Level 2.
• Use knowledge of internal structure of the autonomous system to identify specific
tests that target internal systems.
• Use these tests to evaluate the impact of GNSS attacks on these internal systems.
Faster than real-time Real-time
User-in-the-loop
Real World
Trials
Track/Controlled
Testing
WMG Anechoic 
Chamber
Digital World
- Simulation
Increasing ability to choose scenarios
Flexibility to test different technology
Efficiency
Realism
Control of operating 
environment
Dependence upon real system availability
Aim: to identify and create test methods for the development of 
cyber-physical test facilities, based on a Lab2Live approach
c© 2020 WMG
Figure 4.1: Learning from a continuum of simulation, testing, trials and early deployment
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time
Real World
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Track/Controlled
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Digital World
- Simulation
Simulated
Environment
Aim: Physical testing inspired by lab-based simulations and tests
c© 2020 WMG
Figure 4.2: Link Testing Continuum to V-process
4.3 Testing Environment
The practical feasibility study that has been carried out in the course of this project follows
WMG’s Intelligent Vehicles research team’s view on achieving CAV adoption through the learning
from a continuum of simulation, testing, trials, and early deployment. It is important that
testbeds are able to facilitate cyber-security testing across such continuum with a Lab2Live
approach, as shown in Figure 4.1, starting with computer-based simulations that provide a first
input on parameters and their ranges of interest, as well as hard- and software requirements for
physical experiments on the device or vehicle of interest. Lab-based work in a closed environment
then supports the control of most external parameters, allowing for high reproducibility and
potential programmable repeatability of tests. Moreover, a lab provides a safe environment in
which controlled scenarios can be investigated, in particular the corner-case scenarios that are
unpractical or impossible to carry out in the real-world. Finally, live tests and measurements
are required for guaranteeing a device’s level of operation under real-world conditions, whilst
experiencing real noise and interference for all sensors that interact with the device and might be
affected by them. This allows the resilience of a VUT to first be evaluated in a highly controlled
environment and then move to a less controlled, but more realistic, environment, as graphically
depicted in Figure 4.2.
Specification 2: A test facility should support performing tests over the full range
of the test continuum, from simulation to emulation to testing in a real world environment.
There need to be sufficient capabilities across the UK to support the testing of jamming
or spoofing GNSS signals: (i) using GNSS testing equipment via a physical connection to
the CAV’s GNSS receiver or (ii) an over-the-air attack with a portable GNSS simulator
enclosed within a anechoic chamber.
If possible, specific test sites should also aim to (iii) support live, outdoor, jamming or
spoofing of GNSS signals. This is required to test the feasibility of such attacks in a
real-world environment and to further improve the simulations of such attacks.
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4.3.1 Equipment Specification
In order to perform testing of GNSS receivers, attack emulators will need to support specifications
similar to those listed below.
• Multiple constellations:
– GPS and Galileo as baseline options. Simulator should support GLONASS, Beidou
and QZSS to ensure generic appeal and to fully exercise devices that support these
constellations.
∗ 16+ channels available per Code simulated.
· Ensure all SVs in sight can be modelled.
· Ability to transmit PRN code without Nav Data.
∗ Required for achieving Nav Data spoofing.
• Rinex ephemeris data:
– All Rinex parameters must be simulated in order to match live sky (including SV
clock and system offsets).
• Realtime operation:
– No pre-processing required so spoofing attacks can be easily performed.
• Signal Accuracy:
– Pseudorange Accuracy 3 mm RMS
– Pseudorange Bias 0 mm RMS
– 1PPS to RF Alignment < ±2 ns
– Inter Frequency Alignment < ±250 ps (±75 mm)
• Simulator interfaces:
– −60 dBm (High power) GNSS output
∗ This is to ensure that there is sufficient GNSS signal strength to attack the CAV’s
GNSS antenna directly.
– 1PPS input
∗ To synchronise the simulator’s 1PPS event to GPS 1 s epoch (from Reference
receiver). (< 50 ns).
– 10 MHz input
∗ To ensure drift between simulator and live sky is controlled.
• Other features:
– Hardware iteration rate of 100 Hz.
– Realtime remote 6 degrees of freedom trajectory control — Low motion latency less
than 40 ms, measured from point of remote motion input of external sourced vehicle
dynamics to simulation at RF output.
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Specification 3: The equipment used to perform PNT attack emulation should support
technical capabilities that are necessary to perform testing.
Other equipment will also be needed for a testbed, such as portable battery power supplies to
power the PNTAE equipment during mobile test scenarios, and equipment to ensure the safety
of researchers inside and outside of vehicle, as mentioned in Section 3.2.
4.3.2 Test Environment: Anechoic Chamber
c© 2020 WMG
(a) Vehicle entrance to WMG’s anechoic chamber
inside the National Automotive Innovation Centre
c© 2020 WMG
(b) Vehicle under test in WMG’s anechoic 3xD
Simulator inside the International Manufacturing
Centre
Figure 4.3: Two examples of anechoic chambers for vehicular research
Due to the legal requirement to ensure that jamming and spoofing resilience testing does not
have an impact on valid users of GNSS services, it is vital that access to an anechoic chamber is
provided at a testbed. This allows the facility to ensure that any hardwired equipment does not
leak excessive interference and also allows performing OTA testing on the target. At minimum
these chambers should be sufficiently large to support multiple personnel testing individual
receivers, preferably the chamber should be sufficiently large to support bringing a vehicle in to
perform testing on. An ideal chamber would be large enough to support simultaneous testing of
multiple vehicles.
Specification 4: A test facility should provide access to an anechoic chamber to allow
legal testing of OTA attacks on GNSS systems.
4.3.3 Test Environment: Outside
As well as an internal and enclosed chamber, it is vital that testbeds have external facilities
which the resilience of a CAV to GNSS attacks can be tested in. This is necessary because
an outside testing space will provide more realistic conditions (compared to inside a chamber),
allowing testing to be performed that is more representative of the environment in which vehicles
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may be attacked. It is necessary for a test facility to provide access to multiple environments,
as the kinds of attacks and how they are performed may be impacted by the environment in
which the vehicle and adversary are operating in. Due to legal reasons this testing will likely
require non-OTA testing, where a malicious signal is supplied by a physical cable instead of being
wirelessly transmitted.
Specification 5: A test facility should provide areas in which non-OTA testing can
be safely performed in real-world environments. A variety of environments (e.g., urban,
rural, motorway) need to be supported to test the environmental impact on an attacker’s
capabilities and the impact on the implemented mitigations.
4.4 Metrics
In order to evaluate the attack resilience of a system, first a set of metrics needs to be defined.
These metrics have been split into two categories, for when a black or grey box approach to
testing is used. With respect to the performance of the GNSS receiver and/or the CAV, the
following criteria which have been adopted from the required navigation performance (RNP)
concept and aspects of the CCAV code of practice [28]:
Accuracy characterises the localisation error between the ground truth and the estimated
position of the CAV. The root mean square error (RMSE) is widely used in the academic
literature and can be obtained using Equation (4.1), where xi and yi are the estimated
coordinates/position and x, y are the ground truth coordinates. The maximum absolute
position error, mean absolute position error or euclidean error can also be adopted [3, 5].
Ermse =
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 (4.1)
Integrity characterises the correctness of the information supplied by the PNT system. Further-
more, integrity measures the ability of a navigation system to provide the user with timely
warnings when the information provided is inaccurate. The integrity of a navigation system
can be reported via the alert limit, integrity risk, time to alert and protection level [29].
Continuity measures the ability of a GNSS/PNT receiver to operate without failure or inter-
ruption. In the academic literature and industry, it is usually referred to as a probability
that the receiver is operational after initialisation. It is directly related to integrity and
accuracy, hence it describes the probability of having a reliable operation over a specified
period [29].
Availability is the amount of time a GNSS/PNT receiver provides usable PNT information. It
generally represented as the percentage of time in which the navigation system is usable. In
regards to CAVs, GNSS availability can be defined as the percentage of the measurement
epochs where the terminal delivers the considered output with the required performance
irrespective of signal strength [30].
Resilience measures the ability of a system to recover after being attacked. An aspect of
resilience is the length of time the system takes to recover. During this recovery period, it
is important to consider what functionality is available during this period.
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Safety properties ensure that the system does not enter into a state which would place the
vehicle or its occupants in danger. This property may be evaluated in terms of risk, where
safety is defined as the absence of unavoidable risk [28, §2.7].
Specification 6: A standard set of metrics needs to be defined and used to evaluate
the resilience of CAM systems when their PNT system is under cyber-attack.
A key component of defining these types of metrics is that for each one a performance measure
needs to be provided. During performing testing, the response of the VUT needs to be within
this tolerance. For example, if a VUT’s GNSS receiver is jammed, the expected outcome could
be that the vehicle comes to a stop, and the performance measure could be the time taken for
the vehicle to come to that stop. This value will be based on various scenario-related aspects,
such as the vehicle, the adversary’s jamming approach, the jamming equipment used, and the
road environment. Therefore, future work needs to consider what performance measures should
be set to test vehicles against. Section 5 of [31] presents security performance metrics which
could form a useful starting point for the definition of these performance measures.
Table 4.1: Black Box Testing Metrics [8]
# Description Performance criteria
BB1 Vehicle Stops Safety
BB2 Vehicle continues moving along desiredroute Availability
BB3 Vehicle recovers after attack Resilience
BB4 Vehicle requires human intervention Resilience
Table 4.2: Grey Box Testing Metrics [6, 7, 9]
# Description Performance criteria
GB1 GNSS receiver continues to generateNMEA messages Availability
GB2 Position Accuracy Accuracy
GB3 Number of visible SVs
GB4 Number of SVs used
GB5 Time to first fix (s) Availability
GB6 Timing error (ns) Accuracy
GB7 Re-acquisition time Availability
GB8 Ability to switch between PNT sources Continuity
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4.4.1 Vehicle Modes
Vehicles (and especially autonomous vehicles) may operate in different modes, where only certain
kinds of sensor input are used to perform autonomous tasks. If a vehicle supports operating in a
GNSS-only mode, it is important to test both that mode and other modes which fuse GNSS
with other sensor input. This allows the resilience to GNSS attack to be evaluated when other
sensors are available.
Recommendation 1: Vehicles should be tested in various driving modes (if possible):
(i) GNSS-only and (ii) fusion of GNSS with other vehicle on-board sensors.
As highlighted by the interviews performed, vehicles will use a wide array of sensors to obtain
PNT information. An adversary will potentially attack these sensors individually, the GNSS
receivers individually, or a combination of sensors (such as LIDAR and IMU). Testbeds need to
be able to support performing testing on combinations of attacks against multiple sensors.
Specification 7: A test facility needs to be able to support evaluating the resilience of
a vehicle against single and multi-sensor attacks.
4.5 Test Cases
TD11 in the Zenzic Roadmap [26, p. 97] specified that a set of scenarios needs to be designed
that will be used to perform reproducible cyber-security testing.
Specification 8: A standard test suite of GNSS jamming and spoofing attacks should
be defined and made available to organisations performing testing at different test
facilities.
Table 4.3: Two Example Test Cases
Name Description Attack Aim Black Box Grey Box
Straight
Line
Jamming
Adversary jams GNSS
signals while the vehicle
is travelling in a
straight line (varying
techniques available).
Prevent vehicle from
having access to
position or timing
information
BB1
BB2
GB1–9
Spoofed
GNSS
Variables
Adversary spoofs the
GNSS data stream to
include invalid values.
Prevent GNSS receiver
from correctly
calculating position or
time
BB1
BB2
GB1–9
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4.5.1 Jamming
While jamming tests using GNSS simulators are fairly understood, extensive tests also need to
be carried out with jammers such as personal privacy devices (PPDs) as seen in unintentional
jamming attacks. The electromagnetic features of these devices are known to vary widely.
Jamming detection and mitigation techniques can then be evaluated and characterised with
respect to decoupled PPDs; whereby a diverse range of PPDs are disassembled and the RF
components parameterised in a controlled RF enclosure such as a Faraday cage.
4.5.2 Spoofing
Given that different vehicle manufacturers will use different GNSS receivers and implement
different integration and operating systems, extensive field tests need to be carried out using
spoofing simulators/emulators (such as Spirent’s PNTAE) in the field. By using a simulator/emu-
lator designed to specification, representative, repeatable, affordable and controlled tests can be
carried out in the field. Testbeds with such features would provide avenues for CAM system
and service designers to evaluate heterogeneous implementation architectures adopted by vehicle
manufacturers. Furthermore, by carrying out field tests using spoofing emulators/simulators, the
behaviour (safety and availability) of CAVs can be isolated from that of the GNSS receiver when
subjected to a series of spoofing attacks.
4.5.3 Software
The primary test case for GNSS software attacks will be to spoof a signal with specific values
for high impact variables in the navigation message data included in a GNSS signal. For GPS
this will include: (i) Ω0: the longitude of the ascending node of the orbit plane at weekly epoch,
(ii) Ω˙: the rate of right ascension, and (iii)
√
A: the square root of the semi-major axis [15, 32].
Due to the large state space and long time period to receive this information, only a limited
number of values can be tested. Specific values should be chosen (such as 0 =
√
A) based on the
potential for a high impact, to be tested together with a small number of random values.
4.6 Controlled Testing
In order to perform effective testing, it is necessary to compare the effects of testing on an
unknown vehicle to a control vehicle that has already been extensively tested. This ensures
that when tests are performed, there is greater confidence in the test when the control vehicle’s
response is the expected response. This facilitates accounting for variables in a test that may be
difficult to keep similar when testing in a real-world environment.
Specification 9: A test facility should supply a group of control vehicles with known
functionality and responses to a test suite. This is in order to:
• Ensure the test has the same impact on the control vehicle.
• Evaluate the possible different impacts on the test and control vehicle.
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4.7 Attack Feasibility Evaluation
PNT attack emulators are capable of perfectly emulating GNSS signal attacks. It is important to
perform PNTAE-based testing in a real-world environment in order to determine the feasibility
of an adversary performing such an attack, albeit of a lesser quality. For example, OTA PNT
attacks on a moving CAV are the most difficult to perform, because of the difficulty anticipating
the vehicle’s trajectory in order to accurately determine its relative motion to the attacker. A
possible testing solution is a mobile PNTAE that can be positioned and operated from inside the
CAV, and coupled to the CAV’s GNSS receiver through an external antenna.
Specification 10: A set of appropriate sites need to be identified where PNT attacks
can be performed in real-world environments in order to understand and demonstrate
the feasibility of an adversary performing these attacks.
4.8 National Security
Testbeds that undertake cyber-security testing need to consider the relation of the testing to
national security. Firstly, the testing needs to be performed such that pertinent threats to
national security are focused on. This means that a testbed needs to have a connection to receive
up-to-date information from the defence sector. Secondly, as testing could be performed on
systems that either interact with or form part of the nation’s critical national infrastructure, the
testbed needs to be able to report information, such as uncovered vulnerabilities, to the relevant
authorities. This means that a testbed needs to have a connection in order to report information
to the defence sector, government and organisations that maintain the CNI.
Specification 11: A test facility needs to have contacts with relevant authorities in
order to guide the testing performed in terms of the national interest.
Specification 12: A test facility needs to be able to hold classified information and
have the ability to report information such as critical vulnerabilities to the relevant
authorities.
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4.9 Support System-of-Systems Testing
3rd Party VehiclesCloud
V2I
GNSS
Infrastructure
Edge
Key
Vehicular & Infrastructure
Communication
GNSS
Devices and Peripherals Vehicle
Figure 4.4: Reference Architecture showing vehicular system-of-systems [4]
“ There seems to be a gap in UK capability in testing PNT at the system-of-systemslevel. For example, how can we fully test a system where inputs from multiple sensors,GNSS, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, accelerometers and gyros are all blended together? Or howall the components of a car, fire engine or aircraft work together in all conditions and
locations? On a sunny day in Oxfordshire, how do you conduct worst-case testing of
the navigation and communications systems used by emergency services?
Government Office for Science, 2018 [6, p. 82] ”
CAM systems are themselves a system-of-systems, as they contain many different interacting
components. It is important to be able to test these systems considering the impact of other
aspects of the system-of-systems, for example, how are other sensor inputs manipulated to reflect
a GNSS attack that is being simulated? CAM systems also form a system-of-systems with the
infrastructure they interact with, this includes the roadside infrastructure (such as traffic lights
and communication devices), other CAM systems, and other services that are accessed via the
internet. The relations and interactions between this system-of-systems are complex and need to
be able to be tested under attack. For example, what impact will a stationary attacker have,
which is spoofing GNSS for roadside units, on vehicles quickly moving through the region being
spoofed? Testbeds need to support the testing of such complex scenarios.
Specification 13: A testbed should provide facilities that support testing of the PNT
attack resilience of individual components and multiple interacting systems.
4.10 Test Facility Employees
As well as the technical specifications of a GNSS cyber-security testbed, it is also important to
consider the requirements of the employed staff at testbeds. Employees at a testbed will need
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broad skills in three key domains of radio frequency, automotive, and cyber-security. It was
raised during our interviews that having employees with the right training is crucial.
Radio frequency skills are required in order to understand the physical layer and related
technical details of a GNSS signal attack, including the test and measurement methods
that will be used and how the attacks can be legally emulated.
Automotive skills are important in order to apply the use of GNSS-provided PNT to relevant
automotive systems. More specifically, knowledge is required about how CAM systems use
PNT and what expected fallbacks are if information is unavailable or incorrect.
Cyber-security skills are required in order to identify which threats are high priority to focus.
This means identifying adversaries and their motivations, goals, capabilities and other
aspects. These skills will also ensure correct disclosure procedures are followed if critical
vulnerabilities are discovered.
Specification 14: Employees at test facilities need to have skills in RF, cyber-security
and automotive.
When running a cyber-security testbed it is important to perform vetting of employees to
mitigate potential risks. This also includes managing risks posed by contractors and support
staff, such as being exposed to sensitive information and insider threats.
Specification 15: Employees at test facilities need to be suitably vetted, and risks
posed by employees and contractors (i.e. insider threat) need to be appropriately
managed.
4.11 Standards for GNSS Testing
“ The main problem in this area is that there are no published performance standardsthat could be used directly to compare the resilience and robustness of one GNSSreceiver or system against another. Instead, purchasers must rely on manufacturerspecifications, or conduct their own comparative evaluation testing.
Government Office for Science, 2018 [6, p. 78] ”
It is important to consider both attacks which threat actors are capable of performing now,
as well as attacks that adversaries are not yet capable of, but may become capable of in the near
future. Identifying the changes that will lead to novel attacks in the future is challenging, so it is
important to monitor the evolving threat landscape. An impact analysis of these threats will
need to be performed in order to prioritise those with greatest effects on CAM systems.
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Recommendation 2: A set of standards needs to be created to measure the resilience
of PNT attacks against CAM systems.
The European Committee for Standardization (ECS) is currently developing EN 16803-3 [31]
which is a draft standard for assessing the security of GNSS receivers. The British Standards
Institution (BSI) makes this draft standard available for UK stakeholders to engage with providing
comments to the ECS. While this document provides useful guidelines on jamming and spoofing
attacks, there is no consideration of software attacks. However, the draft standard does include
a focus on testing vehicles equipped with GNSS receivers. Zenzic, Spirent and WMG should
consider using lessons learnt in this project to feed into this standard.
4.12 Subscribe to GNSS Threat Monitoring and Reporting
There are a number of bodies that report on detected GNSS threats such as the US Coast
Guard and the ITU [21]. Information from these bodies should be subscribed to so that GNSS
testing for CAVs is up-to-date with current state-of-the-art attacks being used in the wild. GNSS
cyber-security testing standards should be periodically revised to take into account changes in
the detected attacks currently being performed. Recommendations from the STRIKE3 project
on threat reporting [12] could be used as a basis for this system. This recommendation relates
to TD09 in the Zenzic Roadmap [26, p. 97], as this information should be used to update the
national threat database that TD09 proposes developing.
Recommendation 3: A test facility should subscribe to GNSS threat monitoring
and reporting services and use the provided information to revise standards and testing
strategies based on real-world incidents.
4.13 Facility Directory
“ However, there is no central register or database of UK facilities for PNT testing,making it difficult for an organisation to obtain information on where it can carry outwork or whether testing is possible. Creating such a database will greatly improveawareness for all organisations, and lower the barriers to access for small to medium
sized businesses.
Government Office for Science, 2018 [6, p. 83] ”
Following on from an issue highlighted in [6, p. 83], there is a lack of a suitable database
of existing facilities to perform PNT-related testing. There are two issues here, the first is
that additional information needs to be provided by other existing testbeds on their GNSS test
supporting capabilities. It would be preferable for Zenzic to maintain a central database on
these capabilities to simplify the process for interested parties to find appropriate test sites.
The second issue is that non-automotive GNSS testing facilities may benefit from the sources
available in automotive-focused testbeds and vice-versa. Efforts should be made to reach out
to these facilities, for example, the MIMO chamber of the Satellite Applications Catapult in
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Harwell, and the SMART chamber of the National Physical Laboratory in Teddington, in order
to better integrate GNSS attack testing between automotive and non-automotive facilities.
Recommendation 4: Zenzic should maintain a directory of existing facilities and of
their supported aspects of cyber-security testing.
4.14 Non-Automotive Testing
Multiple other domains exist which would benefit from the systematic organisation of GNSS
testing facilities. The provision of an automotive GNSS PNTAE could potentially be expanded
in order to facilitate the testing of related applications and equipment. This may include non-
transport domains such as financial services, energy, communications, agriculture, infrastructure
monitoring [6], or non-automotive transport areas such as aviation [6] and maritime [33].
Recommendation 5: A test facility should consider to facilitate testing classes of
CAM beyond automobiles, such as UAVs, USVs and UUVs.
4.15 Conclusion
These specifications and recommendations have been made such that:
• There is a clear approach to performing testing (Specifications 1, 2, 8, 9 and 10 plus
Recommendation 1),
• There is a method to evaluate the results (Specification 6 plus Recommendation 2),
• The equipment and environment needed to perform this testing is known (Specifications 3,
4 and 5) and well documented (Recommendation 4),
• Testing is relevant (Specifications 11 and 13 plus Recommendation 3),
• Detected issues can be reported (Specification 12),
• Testbed employees have relevant skills (Specification 14) and are sufficiently vetted (Spe-
cification 15),
• Testbeds should consider facilitating non-automotive testing (Recommendation 5).
These specifications and recommendations provide a path to facilitating more comprehensive
and systematic testing of GNSS cyber-security for CAVs. Implementing these needs to be
performed in collaboration with national and international bodies monitoring GNSS attacks
(such as STRIKE3) and creating standards to measure resilience against attacks (such as ECS
and BSI). There needs to be collaboration between automotive and non-automotive testing
of GNSS cyber-security to reduce duplication of effort and to transfer knowledge between the
different domains.
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5 Conclusions
In this report we have presented specifications and recommendations for a GNSS cyber-security
testbed for CAVs. These specifications and recommendations have been derived from:
1. Existing work which has made recommendations for testing,
2. A survey of academic literature on types of attacks and the techniques to detect and
mitigate these attacks,
3. Interviews with experts in automotive, GNSS and cyber-security domains,
4. Our own experiences from performing testing in laboratory and real-world settings.
5.1 Findings
In recent years there has been an increased interest in improving the resilience of GNSS receivers
against attacks such as spoofing and jamming. This has been demonstrated in projects such as
STRIKE3, where practical evidence of GNSS jamming attacks were used to motivate standards
for reporting of such events. The UK Government Office for Science also produced a Blackett
review on satellite-derived time and position, focusing on the impact of GNSS attacks on aspects
of the UK’s CNI. As part of this report recommendations were made to improve the CNI’s
resilience to GNSS attacks.
In order to focus on CAV-specific threats and testing we interviewed experts in the automotive,
GNSS and cyber-security community and performed our own testing on devices in both a
laboratory and real-world setting.
Our interviews highlighted that attacks against GNSS are feasible for adversaries to perform
and that there are incidences of them occurring in practise. It was also highlighted that there is
no finalised standard available to measure resilience following a standard testing methodology
(although this is being addressed by the ECS and BSI in [31]). The third key point raised was
that to improve resiliency GNSS-provided PNT needs to be fused with other sensors on a vehicle
and this can be expected to also be required on aspects of the infrastructure that forms part of
ITS.
The results from the lab-based and real-world, live-sky work provided different, but comple-
mentary results. A plethora of ways to execute PNT attack scenarios exists, hence both lab-based
and live testing require labour-intense work before all interesting parameters are investigated,
and a complete and reliable conclusion on a system’s PNT-attack resilience can be provided.
In order to carry out the full range of Lab2Live tests, a PNT attack emulator, as used in this
presented feasibility study, is an ideal component of a robust research methodology.
From this experience we developed a set of specifications and recommendations for a GNSS
cyber-security testbed for CAVs and made the following three key findings:
1. Spoofing and jamming attacks on GNSS signals are capable of leading to severe loss of
functionality and safety in CAVs by denying them access to or providing them with incorrect
positioning, navigation, and timing information.
2. PNT testing facilities are urgently needed across a wide spectrum of capabilities, from
simulation in artificial environments to over-the-air testing in labs and real-world environ-
ments. Procedures to legally perform real-world testing via OTA broadcasts need to be
developed.
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3. There is existing work on the standardisation of GNSS attack detection and GNSS resiliency
assessment. Zenzic, UK CAV testbeds, the University of Warwick and Spirent should work
with these bodies to guide the development of standards, and to further develop both
attack event detection and responsible disclosure of information on threat actors and attack
events.
5.2 Specifications and Recommendations
Throughout this report, specifications and recommendations have been made to inform CAV
testbeds of what functionalities they need to provide as part of a GNSS cyber-security test facility.
The specifications and recommendations that were made, fall into the following categories:
• There is a clear approach to performing testing,
• There is a clear method to evaluate the results,
• The equipment and environment needed for this testing is known and well-documented,
• Testbed employees have relevant skills and are sufficiently vetted.
• Detected issues can be reported,
• Potential future capabilities could allow testbeds to consider facilitating non-automotive
GNSS cyber-security testing.
From the lessons learnt and findings of this project, and the derived specifications and
recommendations for a GNSS cyber-security test facility for CAVs, it can be seen that threat
actors, attack vectors, and required countermeasures will evolve. As a result, government and all
associated stakeholders need to continue to work together to foster collaborative research and
development that is capable of testing and certifying PNT for CAVs and CAM in the UK. The
specifications for GNSS cyber-security test facilities made in this document will enable further
testing of a critical aspect of CAVs, CAM and ITSs.
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